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YVES DE MONTCHEUIL: ACTION, JUSTICE AND THE KINGDOM IN 
SPIRITUAL RESISTANCE TO NAZISM1 
 
DAVID GRUMETT 
 
[The few existing studies of the Jesuit martyr and theologian Yves de Montcheuil 
focus on aspects of his doctrinal theology and biography. This article combines 
those considerations with philosophical and political ones by examining how his 
spiritual resistance to Nazism emerges from his study of action and justice in the 
work of Nicolas Malebranche and Maurice Blondel. Montcheuil’s oeuvre 
culminates in a lived theology of sacrifice, and provides a valuable example of 
how the French war experience contributed to doctrinal development in areas 
such as faith and action, liberation theology, church-state relations, and lay 
ecclesiology.] 
 
In recent decades, deep reflection and impassioned debate have been provoked in 
Christian theology by the atrocities perpetrated by the Nazi regime against the 
Jewish people and other groups, the personal suffering inflicted on numerous 
individual lives, and the countless heroic acts of resistance to persecution. Much 
of this theology has German and Protestant origins, and has posed many 
searching and challenging questions: Where was God in Auschwitz? Why did 
God constitute the world in such a way that unjust suffering on a massive scale 
was possible? What is the place or value of suffering in God’s plan for the 
salvation of the world? In this essay I wish, whilst in no way denying the crucial 
importance of these and associated questions, to consider a different type of 
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theological response to Nazism, as found in the writing and witness of a little-
known Jesuit theologian and martyr. 
Yves de Montcheuil provided the spiritual resistance of the French church 
to Nazism with major theological impetus and practical assistance.2 Henri de 
Lubac, writing in 1987, nevertheless described him as “almost forgotten,” whilst 
Étienne Fouilloux referred, in 1995, to his progressively declining theological 
influence over the preceding quarter century as a “second death.”3 Born in 1900 
in Paimpol on the north coast of Brittany, Montcheuil attended a Jesuit college in 
St Helier on Jersey as a child and entered the Society of Jesus in 1917, remaining 
in St Helier at the Maison Saint-Louis. This was technically an exile: clergy and 
members of religious orders were not permitted to teach in French schools 
following the 1902 Combes legislation secularising the education system, and 
parents who wished their children to benefit from a religious education would 
send them abroad, often to French religious communities in exile. Yet Jersey was 
not far across the water from his home town. In 1919, he commenced his 
scholasticate in Canterbury, which continued in 1922 following two years’ 
compulsory military service in France. He was awarded a licentiate in philosophy 
from the Sorbonne, and in 1934, following four years’ study in Lyons, a 
doctorate by the Gregorian University. He then accepted a teaching post at the 
Institut Catholique in Paris, which he held until being shot by the Gestapo on 10 
August 1944.4 Montcheuil was among the most theologically significant catholic 
martyrs of the Second World War, developing a theology of action, justice and 
the kingdom that he lived out in active spiritual witness against Nazism. 
 
LOVE, JUSTICE AND ACTION IN MALEBRANCHE 
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Montcheuil’s doctoral thesis, “L’Intervention de Malebranche dans la querelle du 
pur amour,” addressed the notion of disinterested love (l’amour désintéressé) in 
the Augustinian theology of Nicholas Malebranche, and sought to resolve aspects 
of the disputes about whether or not this conception of love amounted to a 
quietist one. Monthcheuil wished to demonstrate the impossibility of any 
apolitical notion of love, arguing that a true love of self is inseparable from the 
self’s love of God and of justice. These loves might, moreover, have practical 
implications, and call people of faith to shape the world in greater conformity 
with the order of justice divinely willed for it. 
Malebranche had argued, in his 1680 Treatise on Nature and Grace, that 
God acts in nature mostly by means of his general will.5 This enabled 
Malebranche to develop an account of the existence of natural evils not as 
directly willed by God, but as the result of God willing a world reflecting divine 
wisdom and simplicity by producing the greatest number of effects by means of 
the fewest laws. Malebranche believed, as an occasionalist, that God is the only 
true cause of effects in nature, but also maintained that human freedom is among 
the greatest of the effects of divine wisdom. 
These intuitions provide the background to the 1684 Treatise on Ethics, in 
which Malebranche argued that moral action requires a love of the immutable 
order which God reveals to those souls under grace.6 He insisted that God is the 
greatest human good on the grounds that God is the sole origin of happiness. He 
believed, moreover, that morally good action, being grounded in God, confers 
happiness on the self. If God is the soul’s greatest good, and love of God is 
necessary for the moral life, then acting morally will necessarily have the effect 
of bringing the soul happiness. Malebranche insisted—unsurprisingly, in light of 
the importance of human freedom in his theodicy—that the love needed for moral 
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action required the free exercise of the will. The good will freely strives to be 
guided by the objective relations of perfection which hold among the various 
different possible objects of love. The intensity of the soul’s love for particular 
objects should, moreover, match the order of perfection of those objects, with 
those situated in the higher attainable orders being sought in preference to those 
in the lower ones. 
In 1699, Malebranche published his Treatise on the Love of God, 
accompanied by Three Letters to Lamy.7 In these writings, he rejected the charge 
of François Lamy (1636–1711) that the Treatise on Ethics advocated the quietist 
position that moral action is derived from a disinterested “pure love” of God. 
This is the controversy on which Montcheuil focuses, believing it to be crucial to 
a proper understanding of Malebranche’s theology of love (MQ 16), and more 
widely, to the rehabilitation of Malebranche as a figure of theological and 
spiritual stature. Malebranche states clearly his belief that a disordered love of 
self should be contrasted not with pure love of God, as in the quietist position 
with which Lamy had identified him, but rather with an ordered love of creation, 
which includes the soul’s love of itself. The political implications of his theory 
are most clearly elucidated in the chapter of Montcheuil’s study of Malebranche 
on “Disinterested love of man on earth” (MQ 249–308). Earthly loves need to be 
ordered in such a way that the hierarchy of perfections is respected (MQ 253). 
This principle establishes a close relation between the soul’s love of God and its 
love of justice and order: in fact, true love of God is nothing other than the love 
of order and justice. This is because the idea of God as justice—or, more 
specifically, as sovereign justice—provides a better means of regulating the 
soul’s particular loves than any other idea of God which the imagination presents 
to the mind (MQ 255–6). Justice establishes the ordering of loves in the world 
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and the right priorities and relations between their objects. The divine origin of 
justice means, however, that the just order cannot be equated with a particular 
state of affairs existing at a particular time. Montcheuil continues: 
Order is not a simple object of contemplation, but a rule for action. The 
divine will acts necessarily, and in a sense infallibly, in conformity with 
Order. In so doing, God does not obey a foreign law, but remains faithful 
to his proper nature: the law which directs him, he began by establishing, 
not by a contingent decision, but by virtue of his being itself. For 
humankind, it is different: Order imposes itself like an obligation to which 
it submits; it is not legislator. It is in this sense heteronomous. (MQ 256) 
Malebranche’s opposition to quietism thus becomes clearly apparent: love is 
intrinsically active, and requires obedience to a divine will. The quietist 
identification of the love of God with pure, disinterested love suggests, 
Montcheuil implies, a confusion of earthly human love with the love of the saints 
in heaven, which he had discussed in the preceding chapter. Only for the saints 
can the love of God be identified with pure love, rather than with concrete 
precepts of justice. In earthly life, the heteronomy to which Montcheuil refers 
will always operate, imposing on humanity the obligation to make the best 
possible use of its free will in accordance with the rule which order provides for 
it. 
Montcheuil nevertheless identifies, in his defence of Malebranche against 
Lamy, a tension in Malebranche’s own theory of love between the pursuit of 
justice and of happiness. Malebranche had perceived an unproblematic relation 
between the two: the soul working to promote justice would be seeking the best 
particular representation of its love of God, and would thus gain happiness. 
Montcheuil reacts critically to this supposition: 
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If pleasure were the end of love and of the action which inspires it, one 
would wish that God change, that he cease always to provide the model of 
justice for us, in order that we be happier, as we deserve. If this is not the 
case, then that is because God is truly the end of love. (MQ 267) 
Montcheuil here identifies a division denied by Malebranche between the soul’s 
happiness and its ultimate desire for salvation by God. Expressing this distinction 
in practical terms, there are situations in which the soul’s love of God prevents it 
from loving itself by seeking hapiness. Montcheuil thus relocates love within an 
eschatological horizon on which indispensable to the soul’s love of God is its 
hope for salvation (MQ 274). He suggests that, in cases where a conflict exists 
between earthly happiness and earthly order, consistency requires that 
Malebranche privilege order over happiness. The glory of God is nothing other 
than the realization of order, Montcheuil asserts, and its pursuit demands that the 
soul desires salvation above all else (MQ 287). 
Montcheuil’s thesis was not in fact published until 1946, two years after 
his death. He nevertheless pursued his attack on an apolitical notion of love in 
subsequent articles published during his lifetime. Among the most striking of 
these is an extended critique of Max Scheler’s Ressentiment.8 Montcheuil 
sympathizes with Scheler’s concern to invigorate the Christian notion of love 
with the senses of passion, spirit and nobility which conceptions of love 
frequently connoted in classical Greek antiquity. Love cannot, however, be 
understood in the vitalistic way which Scheler advocates. In identifying Christian 
morality with the affirmation of the human spirit, he fails to privilege justice 
above human flourishing, Montcheuil protests, and in fact effectively dispenses 
with justice altogether. Scheler “loosens or cuts the bond of real love and its 
repercussions for the structure of earthly societies and social relationships” (MT 
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205). Montcheuil, whilst accepting that Jesus did not intend to institute a new 
political order, asserts in contrast: “Love will be an effort to penetrate everything 
in the life of humanity in order to become the principle of all action. Nothing can 
remain indefinitely outside this zone of influence.” (MT 208) 
 
LOVE, JUSTICE AND ACTION IN BLONDEL 
 
Montcheuil’s study of Maurice Blondel inspired him to develop further his 
understanding of the relation between faith and action. Blondel’s principal 
achievement was to provide a philosophical demonstration that the value of 
action is absolute and its effects universal, on the grounds that the intention 
motivating action is given to the subject rather than originating within him, and 
always exceeds the boundaries within which particular concrete actions are 
conceived.9 This interest in Blondel had been germinating for several years: 
Montcheuil had told Blondel, in a letter written whilst still in the early stages of 
producing the Malebranche thesis, that his philosophy of action “has a significant 
place in the conception of the interior life that I am little by little constructing.”10  
In 1934, the year in which Montcheuil was awarded his doctorate, he 
collaborated with Auguste Valensin—who had also introduced Pierre Teilhard de 
Chardin to Blondel—to produce a collection of extracts from Blondel’s 
L’Action.11 Montcheuil identifies, in these extracts, five key stages in the 
progressive development of the philosophy of action: the nature and necessity of 
the moral problem; the realization that action is the only legitimate human 
response to this problem; the social repercussions of action; the demands of 
fidelity to one’s action, and to God as its absolute sustaining principle; and the 
social bonds with which action establishes society, politics, the patrie, and the 
  
8 
 
whole human community. This publication was significant in being one of the 
earliest appropriations of Blondel’s philosophy of action by a theologian, making 
Montcheuil “one of the first and the principal propagators of Blondelian thought 
within francophone catholic circles.”12 Blondel was a controversial figure, and 
moves were afoot in Rome around this time to place his oeuvre on the Index. The 
immanentist method of his philosophy of action appeared to undermine the 
classic distinction between nature and grace by arguing for divine activity within 
the world and, in particular, in human action. Blondel was moreover immersed in 
left-wing politics, having taught Marc Sangnier, founder of the Sillon movement, 
and being a contributor to its journals, conferences and educational programmes, 
as well as to the Semaines Sociales. The Jesuit Superior General Wladimir 
Ledochowski tried to block the book’s publication notwithstanding the positive 
verdict delivered by its réviseurs, but was too late to do so as publication was by 
that time already in progress. He instructed, however, that no second edition be 
permitted.13  
Early in the summer of 1938, Montcheuil traveled to Jersey with the 
intention of revising his Malebranche thesis for publication. Following two 
months’ work, he however decided that he could no longer continue with the 
project, and returned to Paris. Reflecting on the reasons for his departure from 
Jersey, he states that he became unable to proceed with his writing in the midst of 
the developing European political crisis. Hitler had annexed Austria in March of 
that year and brutally suppressed all opposition, and France had taken little action 
beyond routine diplomatic protests. Over the summer, Jews living in Austria were 
being required to register their property, and those in Italy were subjected to new 
discriminatory legislation, including in some cases expulsion. In September, large 
numbers of French reservists began to be mobilized, as Nazi preparations 
  
9 
 
advanced to seize Czechoslovakia. Montcheuil protests with anguish about the 
collapse of a political facade of intelligence, honour, duty and fidelity, in the face 
of which “nobody seems to be aware of what has really happened.” He continues 
in his letter: “We have been dragged down into this degradation by a generation 
that will stop at nothing, including treason, in order to ensure that its own social 
privileges are protected.”14 In Paris, Montcheuil’s writing and teaching assumed a 
more overtly social and political character, being intended to exhort Christians to 
live out the implications of their faith in troubled times, and to support them 
pastorally in so doing. He appealed more widely to what Stephen Schloesser has 
described as the cultural “mystic realism” that had developed during the interwar 
period: “the attempt to strip away what was false and ornamental and to grasp a 
sure and lasting reality.”15  
This clearer religious focus is identifiable in a second edited collection of 
Blondel’s work, published in 1942, the year of Ledochowski’s death. This 
volume incorporated a wider range of sources than the 1934 volume, but its 
principal theological trajectory lies in Montcheuil’s clearer insistence on the 
specifically theological character of action. Blondel had sought to demonstrate 
the insufficiency of conceptions of morality that failed to identify action as the 
fundamental moral good. He had argued, moreover, that the effects of action 
could not be confined within particular boundaries but were universal, and that 
implicit in every action was the activity of an absolute principle, that is, God. 
Montcheuil, in contrast, now inverts the terms of Blondel’s argument, which 
were from action to God, wishing no longer to demonstrate the necessity of 
divine activity to human actors, but the necessity of action to the people of God. 
Blondel’s material is now organised in four sections: the necessity of the 
religious problem and the insufficiency of attempted naturalist solutions; the truly 
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religious life and its conditions; religious knowledge; and religious action. 
Montcheuil prefaces the collection with an introductory essay which offers a 
detailed interpretation of Blondel’s oeuvre, with several continuing themes from 
his thesis identifiable, above all the importance of will in moral action (PR 12–
15). In general, moreover, Montcheuil’s insistence that faith in God necessarily 
demands moral action can be seen as a further iteration of his argument about the 
relation between love and action in Malebranche: love is an active regard for the 
just ordering of creation. Finally, the function which Blondel advocates for action 
seems to be analogous with that assigned to justice by Malebranche, enabling the 
love of God to be rooted in material reality. The significance of action lies in the 
translation between hypothetical and real faith which it effects: “All the relations 
posited become, as it were, hypothetically real. Thought ends become real ends: 
conditions which have been shown to be necessary in order to attain them thus 
become obligatory means [moyens].” (PR 28) 
 
SPIRITUAL RESISTANCE 
 
Paris fell to Hitler’s army in June 1940. Within a month, a new government was 
in place with the country divided into an occupied zone in the north, including the 
capital, and a self-governing southern zone centred on the spa town of Vichy. The 
latter included the major Jesuit centre of Lyons. Montcheuil was confronted in 
Paris with new practical and intellectual questions about the type of witness that 
he should be giving against Nazism. Resistance groups increasingly employed 
operational methods just as questionable as those of the Gestapo, and close 
involvement in their activities would have compromised the specifically Christian 
and spiritual character of Montcheuil’s own resistance. He recognized that his 
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calling as a priest lay in building up the faith of the people of God by nurturing 
the roots of their faith and presenting to them its practical implications. The fight 
against Nazism became for him a battle for faith and for Christian consciences.  
The most noteworthy project to which Montcheuil contributed was the 
distribution of the Cahiers du témoignage Chrétien, the underground journal 
which Pierre Chaillet and Henri de Lubac were instrumental in founding in 
November 1941. Montcheuil was unable to take part in the journal’s foundation 
because he was living in France’s northern “occupied” zone, but assumed a major 
role in fostering secret networks for the distribution of the Cahiers in Paris and 
the north of the country.16 The Cahiers became a primary means of disseminating 
reliable information about the occupation of France and the Nazi genocide 
elsewhere, encouraging and exhorting French Christians to conscientious witness, 
and providing accurate versions of papal pronouncements, which in newspapers 
were subject to heavy censorship if they appeared at all. The editors 
acknowledged the role also played by Vatican Radio—in De Lubac’s phrase the 
“true older brother of the Cahiers”17—in this task. Under the director of its 
French section, Father Emmanuel Mistaen, the organisation disseminated both 
broadcasts and, from Marseilles, printed texts of the most significant.18 The 
Vatican resisted continuous German pressure to close it down. 
The Cahiers included news of resistance to Nazism in other European 
countries, and excerpts from the inspirational writings of Karl Barth, 
disseminated from his retreat in Basel. In particular, the second issue included 
extracts from a long letter of Barth’s to French Protestants, in which he 
proclaimed: “Faced with the troubles and obligations of our times, we may not 
remain as outsiders or spectators. Even those who would like to remain neutral 
with respect to them, in reality are not… War brings people to a point of clear 
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decision: a ‘yes’ or a ‘no’, along with all its consequences. We are all implicated 
in this opposition, we are all responsible for its birth and existence; and all of us, 
from one side of the divine or the other, participate in its abolition, whether by 
collaboration, active participation, guilt, or as victims.”19 The Cahiers, whilst 
catholic-directed, thus promoted an ecumenical witness against Nazism. 
Montcheuil contributed an anonymous article on communism, which 
some resistance groups saw as the future of French politics, to one of the 
Courriers du témoignage Chrétien.20 (The Courriers were similar to the Cahiers 
in being clandestine publications, but were shorter in length, produced for a wider 
readership, and addressed more overtly political issues.) Despite his deep 
commitment to action and justice, Montcheuil states unambiguously that 
Christians cannot accept communist ideology: it is atheist, affirms an ultimate 
human achievement on earth, grounds human transformation in economic 
conditions, and suggests that all means are legitimate in pursuit of this end. 
Certain communist aspirations, such as those for justice and fraternity, 
nevertheless express authentic values which can be appropriated in the struggle 
against Nazi persecution.21 
Montcheuil’s decision to pursue a solely spiritual form of resistance is 
illustrated by the equal suspicion with which he regards both the right-wing 
opponents of the communists within the resistance and the communists 
themselves. The reactionary movements possess, like communist ones, he asserts, 
purely material values, employ any available means in their efforts to attain their 
political ends, and defend an exclusivist conception of political order. The unions 
and conflicts within the resistance movement were complex, and lend added 
practical justification to Montcheuil’s theological espousal of spiritual resistance 
rather than direct political action. 
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What does he intend here by charging the opponents of communism, who 
included in their number many conservative catholics, with holding purely 
material values? The argument is not as developed as it might be: De Lubac notes 
the “sometimes insurmountable obstacles encountered in communication between 
the two zones” partitioning the country when transmitting and editing urgent and 
compromising texts.22 There are clear undertones here of De Lubac’s own 
developing critique of the “pure nature” concept that a “natural” realm existed 
independently of divine action, which operated in a separate “spiritual” order. 
What is wrong with purely material values is that they are not founded in a 
recognition that the whole of nature is necessarily infused with divine grace. This 
theology has clear antecedents in Blondel’s immanentist method, many critics of 
which failed to see that establishing an independently-constituted realm of pure 
materiality, far from safeguarding divine autonomy and pure activity in the face 
of pantheist temptations, had the effect of imposing limitations on divine power 
in the form of a realm on which divine activity could have no effect. Montcheuil 
wishes to draw attention to the political implications of this theology: his 
theological opponents were also his political opponents,23 supposing that spiritual 
values were applicable to the church only and had no implications for the larger 
created order. 
In a striking editorial in another Courrier, Montcheuil urges his readers to 
study the Apocalypse of John.24 The drama in which the people of God are 
currently living is, he states, “not only a national drama, since it is at the same 
time and above all, to the highest degree, a spiritual drama.” He then identifies 
the two beasts of chapter 13 with the totalitarian domination of both earthly life 
and spiritual life: “Thus does the totalitarian monster complete itself which is 
unsatisfied so long as it does not possess, together with all other goods, ‘the 
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bodies and the souls of men’.” The positive eschatological vision which 
Revelation presents is also crucial, however. A unifying theme in Montcheuil’s 
clandestine writings is that resistance will ultimately destroy itself if based on 
nothing more than the hatred of enemies. Truly moral action demands the love of 
justice. He proclaims in a later Cahier: 
We do not have the right to tolerate injustice of which others are victims 
when we can correct it. Not to fight against it is to become complicit in 
it.... Justice is indivisible, and not to will it to establish its reign in every 
domain is to sacrifice it everywhere. The duty imposes itself on all 
humanity, but it would be particularly inexcusable for a Christian to 
divest themselves of it.25 
Montcheuil here expresses, in terms derived from his study of Malebranche, the 
priority of justice in the ordering of a world concretely founded on love. It is the 
love of God which unifies the divided soul and enables the soul to act on the 
world which it inhabits, whereas sin brings about the soul’s fragmentation. 
Compromise with any sinful element of social or personal life therefore brings 
with it a refusal of the responsibility presented by the possibility of true, faithful 
action. The soul’s externally-directed force, by means of which it acts on the 
world and shapes it, originates in divine action and is dependent on the continued 
unifying action of divine love.26 
Christian faith thus consists in the combination of the contemplative and 
active lives. Contemplation provides an impulsion into ever more active spiritual 
engagement with the world, in the in actione contemplativus tradition of 
Ignatius’s disciple Jerome Nadal. Contemplation does not precede nor succeed 
action, but accompanies it.27 Montcheuil states in his essay “Temporal Action”: 
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The Christian can neither be a “mystic” who isolates himself in a 
temporal and solitary anticipation of the Union with God ... nor an 
“activist” who lives only for the increase of brotherly relationships in the 
world and who attributes all the worth of religion to the fact that it makes 
these relationships possible by the light of its doctrine and by the aid of its 
fervour. The Christian should combine a religious life lived for itself and 
directed toward eternity with a temporal activity required by the religious 
life in itself.28 
Montcheuil’s most robust embrace of the active life is his controversial essay 
“Nietzsche and the Critique of the Christian Ideal.”29 This paper was suppressed 
by the editors in charge of catholic publishing in Paris, a fact to which De Lubac 
draws attention in his letter of protest to his superiors of 25 April 1941 
challenging their failure to support action opposing Nazism and the Vichy 
regime.30 The paper was therefore published in Cité nouvelle, the substitute 
journal for Études in the southern zone, on 25 June 1941 as the first in a series of 
studies which, De Lubac notes, established a more explicitly political agenda for 
the publication (MT 364). Montcheuil focuses his argument on Nietzsche’s 
critique of the value system he associated with Christian religion. Nietzsche 
complained that Christian morality required conformity to a particular moral code 
and the privileging of passivity above action. The most profound words of the 
evangelists are, he protests, not to resist evil: “The incapacity for resistance here 
becomes morality.”31 Christian morality is, according to this interpretation and 
echoing Scheler’s analysis, one of “resentment,” being a reaction against the 
morality of the noble soul constructed by pagan religion (MT 168). 
 De Lubac was also immersed in Nietzsche at this time, publishing the 
following January his own essay in Cité nouvelle, “Nietzsche et Kierkegaard,” 
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which would contribute to his Affrontements mystiques and eventually Drama of 
Atheist Humanism.32 The chronological sequence suggests that his own interest 
here was inspired by that of Montcheuil. 
Montcheuil accepts many elements of the Nietzschean analysis of what 
Christian morality can in practice become. He disputes, however, Nietzsche’s 
presumption that the essence of Christian morality is to be found in the faults of 
Christian moral practice and teaching. On the contrary, all moral systems are 
rendered provisional by divine grace. Montcheuil concurs with Nietzsche’s 
affirmation of the moral dignity of the freely acting soul: “The soul is not noble 
because it accomplishes acts conforming to an ideal of nobility. Acts are noble 
because they emanate from a noble soul: they lose their value if they are copied 
from outside, supposing that this is possible.” (MT 166) Montcheuil further 
acknowledges, approvingly, Nietzsche’s admiration for Revelation on the 
grounds that the book is motivated by a new understanding of Christian love as a 
positive force of strength and judgment.33 This close connexion between love, 
justice and eschatology is exactly what Montcheuil himself wishes to establish. 
Having appropriated elements of Nietzschean philosophy for his own use, 
Montcheuil acknowledges the fundamental incompatibility of Nietzschean and 
Christian teaching. It would be naïve to suppose that Nietzsche’s protests could 
be shorn of their furiously aggressive excesses and transformed into a new genre 
of Christian spirituality. Nevertheless, “with all doctrines which, whilst wholly 
rejecting Christian dogma, retain Christian values, a partial agreement is possible 
in the domain of practice, when it is a matter of results in which commonly-
accepted values are expressed.” (MT 181) Montcheuil describes the theological 
relevance of these particular secular doctrines as follows: 
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Nietzsche makes us attentive to a falsification that cannot be described 
simply as possible, but that we are continually realizing, and against 
which we must always fight: the justification and canonization of our 
weaknesses and our cowardice under the mask of virtues which carry a 
Christian name.... Grace, which we promise on behalf of Christ to the 
discouraged, is not an aid which would spare him from any part of the 
work and allow him to fulfill his own task more comfortably: it is that 
which acts to accomplish a greater effort. It gives, but it is firstly an effort 
which it gives. Such is its divine paradox. (MT 183) 
Progress in the moral life brings a person closer to God’s revelation (MA 159), 
with no other more explicitly religious motive or awareness possible. 
In his 1941 essay “God and the moral life”, Montcheuil describes 
formation in the moral life in terms of the development of a moral sense, which 
he defines as an immediate and direct intuition of moral values that is not 
dependent on external tradition or reasoning (MT 146). He thus wishes to 
demonstrate how Christians are not reliant solely on church teaching for ethical 
guidance. Moreover, recourse to church teaching is by implication insufficient to 
mitigate acts of omission. Humanity, in cultivating its moral sense, opens itself to 
the grace of God in Christ, and the moral life itself becomes an expression of 
faith (MT 157). 
A standard objection brought against this position is that it undermines a 
necessary contrast between religious commitment and moral action. Montcheuil 
vigorously defends his high valuation of the moral life against such critiques, 
however, arguing that moral life is infused with the grace of God and need to be 
transformed by that grace. Clear similarities can be seen here with the earlier 
argument about the materialism of the scholastic opponents of atheist 
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communists: both rest on the notion of an unmediated separation of the spiritual 
and natural orders 
Most moral decisions are nonetheless determined, in practice, by the 
oppositional “pure nature” conception of moral reasoning inherent in obligation, 
rather than by the moral sense, and are experienced as a movement of will against 
inclination, or of duty against personal pleasure. Nothing is wrong with this 
practical deontology, because obligation is the first moral fact to strike humanity 
and command its attention. Indeed, deontology captures the notions fundamental 
to moral reasoning that moral principles originate beyond nature and that nature 
must therefore conform to them, rather than they to nature. The sense of 
obligation fails to illumine, however, the ultimate principle on which morality 
rests (MT 152). The belief that obligation is the primary motivating factor in the 
moral life is therefore mistaken. Experience of morality as obligation suggests 
that the moral law is set against the self, but nevertheless lived by the self and 
continually created by divine grace. The most important practical effect of this 
teaching is that the Christian experiences a moral call to perform supererogatory 
acts which far exceed in their demands any negative moral requirements not to 
act in particular ways (MT 356). 
Montcheuil here demonstrates his awareness of Bergson’s doctrine of the 
two sources of morality and religion: a morality of movement founded on a 
positive desire to participate in collective spiritual action, which Bergson favours, 
against a static morality which ultimately undermines human life and creativity 
(MT 141, 199). Yet, contra Bergson, the natural movement of the soul by the 
moral sense is an initiative of divine grace. Only grace will enable humanity to 
attain its final end and the supreme values of communion with God, loving 
possession of God, and participation in divine life (MA 136). Because human 
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existence is both temporal and eternal, the image of communion with God 
enjoyed in current temporal life (MA 139) will finally be replaced by the likeness 
of fully realized communion for which humanity strives (e.g. AC 164, 171). 
Humanity is called to seek, “in the temporal and in part through the temporal, an 
end which will only be reached beyond the temporal; of pursuing in and through 
work on oneself, on others, on the world, an end which will not be attained by 
work but rather thanks to an intervention from on high, an end that nevertheless 
cannot be obtained if this work is scorned” (AC 166). 
 
CHURCH, STATE AND THE KINGDOM 
 
Totalitarian state persecution presented classic catholic political theology with a 
tremendous challenge. Political questions facing the French church had typically 
concerned the right of the church to independent existence and intervention in the 
temporal realm in the face of a strong nation-state.34 Indeed, as already discussed, 
Montcheuil had conducted his formation in Jersey and Canterbury rather than in 
France due precisely to the Third Republic’s expulsion of the religious teaching 
orders from the country. This was quite different from the German situation, in 
which dialectical theology emerged as a response to an excessively close 
relationship between church and government in the far younger Prussian state: a 
Hegelian synthesis of church with government and theology with philosophy 
leading, in the catholic case, to the 1933 concordat severely limiting ecclesial 
independence.35 
German churches had not, however, experienced ongoing persecution like 
the church in France. The French church had been occupied with attempts to 
defend its independent existence in the civil sphere since the Revolution, in areas 
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like education. Two recent initiatives of Pope Pius XI (in office 1922–39) 
provided the church-state debate in France with fresh impetus. The 1924 
encyclical Maximam gravissimamque had gone some way towards 
accommodating the church to the relation between church and state which existed 
in France following the 1905 law of separation between the two and the 1920 
restoration of diplomatic relations, by accepting the creation of diocesan 
associations, providing these operated in conformity with canon law. The 1929 
Lateran Treaty, enacted between the Vatican and Italy, clarified the political 
status of the Holy See, following the formation of the Italian state in 1870 and the 
resurgence of Italian nationalism under Benito Mussolini, by establishing the 
Vatican as an independent and neutral city state. 
The responsibility of Christians to defend basic human dignities and 
natural rights against the state had not, in contrast, assumed much prominence in 
catholic political theology. The understanding of political theology as concerned 
with the temporal rights of the church vis-à-vis the state could not, however, be 
sustained any longer. Montcheuil considered the Nazi persecution, and Vichy 
complicity in it, to be bound up with a crisis in modern society of a 
fundamentally spiritual character which the church had primary responsibility to 
address. He refelcts, in his essay “Problems of the state”, on the deep, inner 
collective life intrinsic to Christian identity. Christian faith is lived in community, 
and its concept of humanity is fundamentally that of the person, “neither lost in 
the group nor isolated as an individual, neither the means to an end which is 
beyond him nor an end to himself apart from other men” (GS 27). 
The totalitarian state is naturally hostile to both the church and to the 
human person, seeking to identify the will of the individual with the will of the 
state, to eradicate all meaningful private life, and to replace all community 
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association with an isolated individualism of the direct dependence of the 
individual on the state. An adequate response to Nazism therefore required 
acceptance by the church of its political responsibility to intervene in the events 
taking place, in a way that did not compromise, but preferably restated, its 
specifically spiritual witness in society. Not to fight against injustice would imply 
complicity in it. To consign God to the role of supporting a social religion of 
obedience to those in authority would be “moral treason.” God can never be 
assigned the utilitarian function of being a guarantor of temporal power (MT 
143–4), but places that power under judgment. 
In his essay “The church and the temporal order,” Montcheuil refuses any 
suggestion that the church should be able to undertake its spiritual witness by 
gaining control of the details of state policy, or that the temporal authority of the 
state is delegated to it by the church. The state receives its power from God, not 
from the Church, and is rightly assigned responsibility for providing humanity 
with the temporal conditions needed to enable it to pursue its supernatural end 
(AC 175–6). Montcheuil nevertheless continues to oppose a quietist spirituality in 
later essays, arguing for the surrender of a “social quietism” of faith focused on 
the inner life of the soul. The themes of justice, order and love from his work on 
Malebranche are again apparent, when he states unequivocally: 
The wish for personal sanctification, if it is to fulfil all that is demanded 
of it, requires not only an inner struggle against personal faults and, in 
social relationships, an effort of individual charity for those with whom 
Providence has placed us in contact, but also a fight against all the 
injustices, all the distorted institutions which are opposed on the human 
plan to the communion of men and which give rise to isolation, envy, 
hatred. There is no enlightened sanctification without attention not only to 
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our individual relationships with our neighbour, but also to the state of the 
social relationships and the institutions which express them. (MA 142) 
In particular, love can never become a substitute for justice (GS 19). The defence 
of justice is, Montcheuil argues, the duty of all people, and especially all 
Christians, and will not be assisted by ecclesial control of the political realm. 
The Vichy regime certainly treated the church with greater respect than 
had the Third Republic, and many members of its hierarchy were therefore slow 
to launch effective criticism and thus discredited in the eyes of increasing 
numbers of the faithful.36 Arguably, the best policy that the bishops could 
constructively adopt in public was one of realism, seeking to safeguard their 
Church’s basic functions of prayer and sacramental worship, with occasional 
more outspoken witness if this was not likely to lead to serious reprisals that 
would undermine essential activities.37 Montcheuil does not criticize the bishops 
for alleged inaction, despite his own activism. In light of this absence of contrary 
evidence, it is reasonable to suppose his view of the matter to have been close to 
that of De Lubac, expressed in 1988, who argues that frequent criticisms of the 
policies of the hierarchy, and especially Cardinal Gerlier of Lyons, imply a “lack 
of retrospective imagination, an astonishing ignorance of the circumstances and 
real possibilities” from “historians who have a tendency to set themselves up as 
examining judges without managing to reconstruct the atmosphere of the 
period.”38 De Lubac highlights Gerlier’s successful opposition to the service du 
travail obligatoire, rebuttal of Vichy attempts to reach a concordat with the Holy 
See, personal support of key figures in left-wing organisations, close relations 
with the leaders of Jewish consistories, ecumenical collaboration with Pastor 
Marc Boegner, diocesan speeches, personal interventions to Marshall Pétain, and 
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death threats from collaborationist sections of the press, among sections of which 
his historic honorific designation was distorted to “Primate of De Gaulle.” 
Montcheuil realized that social witness needed to be a primarily lay 
initiative and the shared vocation of all Christians, and could not be regarded as 
solely clergy business.39 The mobilization of lay Christians in any case became a 
prominent feature of political theology in France, led by Montcheuil and other 
intellectuals in religious orders, who Julian Jackson recognizes formed the 
“greatest source of Catholic dissent towards Vichy.”40 Montcheuil was one of a 
group of French theologians whose ecclesiology was influenced by Johann Adam 
Moehler (1796–1838). He draws a clear distinction, in an essay on Moehler, 
between the unity of the church, and the uniformity of its outward forms, 
suggesting that unity, which the church should be pursuing, does not require 
uniformity. What unity does require, however, is an identity of interior 
inspiration.41 This inspiration would be given to the church, in the current 
situation, by its work for justice. Providing that inspiration is present, there is no 
danger that greater lay initiative in the church will, in strengthening its witness, 
undermine its order. 
Montcheuil urges Christians to look on the church “with the eyes of faith” 
in the opening page of his study Aspects of the Church (AC 1). This notion, 
originating in Pierre Rousselot’s controversial eponymous article, suggested that 
participation in church practices, and other outward forms of assent, needed to be 
accompanied by an inward “psychological” assent to those practices and forms in 
order for there to be a true expression of faith. Church teaching could not 
command the immediate assent of Christians simply by virtue of its own internal 
and quasi-legal claims to be authoritative.42 Montcheuil describes the way in 
which the faith of the individual believer looks on the world and acts on it with 
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striking imagery probably derived from an informally-circulated copy of Teilhard 
de Chardin’s The Divine Milieu: the human soul burning with fire (MA 12), the 
milieu as a divine mystery present in the world (MA 19–25), and the duty of 
transforming the milieu by means of action, which is both a human initiative and 
a divine call (MA 29–31).43 Later in the same work, he quotes from Teilhard’s 
1930 essay “The Human Phenomenon”: “The greatest danger which humanity 
may fear is not some exterior catastrophe, famine or plague ... but rather that 
spiritual sickness (the most terrible because it is the most directly antihuman of 
all scourges), the loss of appetite for living.”44 This “appetite for living” is a love 
of life born of a desire to realize love for God in the most concrete way possible 
by recognizing that God continues to reveal in the created order a “perpetual 
transformation of the temporal” (MA 140). 
Montcheuil states that “the Christian has already entered the eternal at the 
same time [as] he continues to live in the temporal” (MA 144; also GS 4). He 
develops this eschatology most fully in retreats given at a camp de rentrée for the 
École de Sèvres at Solemnes during the first half of October 1943, pursuing the 
theme at a teachers’ gathering during Lent 1944. These essays form part of 
Montcheuil’s final theological testimony before his death in August 1944. The 
kingdom of God possesses, he argues, absolute value for the Christian, and can 
be obtained only by the renunciation of all other kingdoms. Referring to Karl 
Barth, Montcheuil asserts that the message of the kingdom is a crisis: a moment 
of absolute choice which shatters absolutely all human values and expectations 
(RE 43). This message might be assumed to compel active intervention in the 
temporal order so that it becomes modelled more closely on the values of the 
kingdom, such as unity and peace. On the contrary, Montcheuil identifies 
different imperatives of the kingdom in a crucial chapter “The kingdom and the 
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temporal order” (RE 83–92), warning, as he did in his critique of Malebranche, 
against assimilating the kingdom to any temporal reality: 
Entry into the Kingdom is a new birth. It is the source of a life which is 
superior to a well-organized natural life, a life which belongs to a 
different, supernatural order. It is the principle of a prayer which has no 
other end but itself, which corresponds with the soul’s need to be present 
to God even as God is present to it. When one has understood this, one 
can see that the spiritual life is irreducible to the social life.... To confuse 
the coming of the Kingdom with the establishment of a better social order 
is to ignore totally the originality and the value of the Kingdom.45 
The eschatological character of Christian claims requires that the substance and 
end of the kingdom transcend material life, even though they commence on earth. 
The inauguration of the kingdom on earth occurs in mystery, and not according to 
any objective prescription for society or politics. Nazi ideology refused to 
recognize precisely this fact. Montcheuil’s argument is not, in other words, only 
with the particular form of society and government which Nazism attempted to 
create, but with any religious or quasi-religious attempt to establish such a 
society. The establishment of a perfect social order is, he states, impossible (RE 
91). The genuine kingdom is born within the Christian heart so intimately and so 
deeply that no visible entity can be counted as evidence of its coming (RE 99). In 
Montcheuil’s Leçons sur le Christ, delivered to a group of teachers and students 
at the Centre Unviersitaire Catholique early in 1944, the kingdom is clearly 
identified as the possession of Christ, with its coming on earth being a future 
eschatological event (also GS 13) which is nevertheless anticipated in the world 
as currently constituted whenever injustice is transformed: 
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In this broken world, no complicity with injustice can be accepted—even 
though it demands refusal of the world—because the union realized at the 
price of injustice can only engender graver disunity; but it must, on the 
other hand, ask of God the transformation of injustice, in order that it is 
possible for him one day to unite the world with him in the love of Christ. 
This applies to both individual and collective relations. There is no 
effective union with God by Christ without this aspiration to union of the 
sons of God in their reclaimed innocence. (LC 121) 
This work to promote justice becomes the work of Christ when the person who 
undertakes it lives in the new principle of love for God that Christ came to bring 
into the world. 
                                                                                                              
SACRIFICE 
 
In a letter written as the Vichy regime was installing itself in power, Montcheuil 
had speculated: “Maybe we will now have the opportunity to learn what it means 
to risk everything to ensure the liberty of the Word of God. When that moment 
comes, we will prove that all the things we were saying before the war were not 
merely the idle chatter of people who enjoy comfort and safety.”46 He expresses a 
sense of impending crisis, both collective and personal, in which fundamental 
spiritual values would be challenged and the commitment of Christians to the 
defence of those values tested to the limit (also AC 170). With Nazi control over 
France progressively increasing, Montcheuil reflects on several different 
occasions on the nature of sacrifice. He thus returns to Blondelian themes, 
focusing on the concepts of purification and passivity: sacrifice is superior to 
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egoism, and the suffering of which sacrifice is the exemplary part cannot be 
understood merely as the voluntary restraint of action.47 Suffering is, in contrast 
a real metaphysical experiment. He who has had the courage to sacrifice 
his egoism and pride in order to remain faithful to the demands 
[exigences] of the truth to the extent that he perceives it, finds in the 
overcoming of life that results the best guarantee that he has not lied to 
himself, the certitude that he is not living an illusion. (PR 31–2) 
Montcheuil describes in greater detail in another essay the active and purifying 
function of suffering: 
Evil, being at the root of our activity, is not curable by that activity itself. 
It is therefore vain to expect evil to correct itself: it is necessary to call for 
its purification. That is not, evidently, to deny the value and necessity of 
ascetic practice. Personal effort is needed, but is only something to the 
extent that it originates in a will that is already purified. If it does not, we 
can only ever correct a fault with another fault. Saint John of the Cross 
has illustrated this fundamental truth well, that all true purification is 
passive, and that in so far as the purification must reach down to the 
lowest depths of the soul, it assumes a new form of passivity: the night of 
the senses must be succeeded by the night of the spirit. This teaching is 
not, as often imagined, a subtle truth applicable only to a few 
“extraordinary” states of the mystical life: it expresses profoundly the 
elementary law of all Christian life. 
To suffer is to undergo a purifying passivity. Suffering is thus the 
only instrument of our purification, the means by which we do not avoid a 
diminution of egoism in the self and the engendering of love. That love is 
acquired only by the cross, that it is an illusion to hope to see it produced 
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in the self by any other means, is the affirmation over which Christian 
asceticism will never compromise. There is a royal way of the cross. 
There is no “short way” and will never be one.... Each soul has its cup to 
drink. If it defers the moment when it takes a sip, it also defers the 
moment when it begins to love more. To progress towards pain and grief 
is to progress towards life. It is to plunge oneself into the only purifying 
crucible which is able to turn us into saints. Suffering is no second-best, 
no unfortunate accident which arrives to complicate things and add a 
burden. It is the way.48 
Suffering brings the human soul to a deeper spiritual witness than does happiness, 
and becomes a requirement of justice. Montcheuil, by identifying suffering as 
participation in the cross of Christ, the source of justice and truth, pursues his 
critique of Malebranche’s equation of happiness with justice to its logical 
conclusion (MA 32, 52, 102). His description of “purifying passivity” moreover 
echoes Blondel’s statement to Teilhard de Chardin reflecting on St John of the 
Cross that “abnegation alone … enjoys, possesses, and knows everything through 
a decentration and a transfer of the self over to God.”49 
The immediate circumstances surrounding Montcheuil’s capture and 
execution were as follows.50 In July 1944, he was contacted by an acquaintance 
who had attended some of his lectures, and who had expressed concerns to him 
that bishops were not appointing chaplains to the maquis resistance movements in 
the south-east of the country. The absence of chaplains was depriving the 
movements’ lay members of the sacraments and pastoral ministry. Montcheuil 
had already established links with some of these members, however, having taken 
part in holidays and youth camps in the south-east during the summer of 1943 
and Easter 1944. Realizing that he was well-placed to assess the situation, he 
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planned a visit to the Vercors area of about one week’s duration, after which he 
would return to Paris and submit his findings to the church authorities. His visit 
coincided, however, with an assault on the resistance group based in the area 
launched on 27 July by Nazi parachutists. Montcheuil and many others took 
refuge in a large and well-hidden cave being used as a secret hospital, and 
believed they had evaded detection after the parachutists had passed in front of 
the cave without identifying it. Several hours later they returned, however, took 
Montcheuil and several others captive, and after taking them to Grenoble, killed 
those still remaining at the cave. During questioning, Montcheuil stated truthfully 
that he was not a member of the resistance group, but conducting a pastoral visit 
to the group. He was shot by firing squad on 10 August, just ten days before the 
town’s liberation by the Allies. 
The chain of events culminating in Montcheuil’s death could be regarded 
as a chance series of unfortunate incidents such as is all too common in times of 
conflict. A dutiful teacher and pastor, Montcheuil had framed no specific 
intention to give up his life in the struggle against Nazism. Étienne Fouilloux 
considers this interpretation of his death, but then offers a quite different one: 
It is also, in a certain way, the logical culmination of an intellectual and 
spiritual engagement contracted at the beginning of the 1920s. When 
action, in the Blondelian sense of the term, is founded on the human 
conscience in search of God, it is unsurprising that it is prepared to 
continue right up to the end of its undertaking under exceptional 
circumstances.51 
Montcheuil follows the previous great French Jesuit theologian of love, Pierre 
Rousselot, to an early death in war.52 Rousselot served as an officer in the French 
army and was killed in battle at Éparges in 1915. Montcheuil quotes, in his 
  
30 
 
critique of Scheler, Léonce de Grandmaison’s comment about Rousselot that “the 
best religious are those who sacrifice and not those who ignore the great 
attachments of nature.”53 It becomes increasingly apparent in Montcheuil’s 
theology that he is preparing himself spiritually to pursue whatever paths of 
action the divine imperatives of justice and the kingdom present to him, even 
death. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Montcheuil repeats approvingly the assessment of his friend and colleague Henri 
de Lubac of one of the causes of totalitarian rule: “Rationalism expelled mystery: 
myth has taken its place.”54 Montcheuil’s response is to reaffirm that at the heart 
of religion lie love, action and eschatology, which render futile all attempts to 
interpret the person and human society in purely natural terms. The supernatural 
must, Montcheuil affirms, be allowed to penetrate the whole of temporal life, 
being the “result of a possession, of a transformed infusion of the divine in us” 
(MA 35; also MA 135, GS 55). The source of religion is not, in other words, to be 
found within pre-existing nature, but has its source beyond nature, acting on 
nature to transform, renew and redeem it. 
In Montcheuil’s oeuvre can be seen the political relevance and origins of 
key themes in modern theology, especially lay ecclesiology and the supernatural. 
It constitutes, moreover, a significant antecedent to postwar liberation theology, 
being an early instance of the appropriation of Blondel’s philosophy of action to 
justify the overtly political implications of Christian faith in a time of crisis.55 
Montcheuil has been identified as a chaplain of the maquis (the underground 
resistance movement) when in fact he was an accidental martyr, captured during 
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a single visit to it motivated by specifically spiritual and pastoral concerns. He 
did not seek to become an activist, but was a figure for whom spiritual concerns 
became political ones because the context in which spirituality was located had 
shifted. 
De Lubac reflects on the role that Montcheuil “might have played, within 
the Church and for her influence, in the troubled period after the war (and again 
after the Council).”56 Montcheuil had conceived his theological writing as part of 
a wider project to synthesize the Augustinian and Thomist traditions by means of 
a doctrine of love, and to use this, in engagement with modern authors, as the 
foundation for an exposition of the entire Christian mystery.57 He had not begun 
work on this larger study at the time of his death. What he did leave, however, 
was a lived testimony of love proven in the sacrificial pursuit of justice for the 
sake of the church, and above all else, the kingdom of Christ. 
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